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I. Introduction
A.

SCOPE

This memo discusses definitions of “adequate representation”, in international tribunals
and, for comparison, the American standard. It will look at what the standards are, and under
what conditions a claim of inadequate representation provides grounds for appeal.* Because
there is no established definition of adequate representation in the international tribunals, this
paper will formulate such a definition through looking at common reasons why defendants claim
that their counsel was ineffective or inadequate. It will also look for guidance on this issue to the
Internal Rules of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and the Code
of Professional Conduct for each of the international tribunals.
B.
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS – INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL CONTEXT
1. In international tribunals, inadequate representation of counsel might be
recognized if defence counsel either: a) was incompetent, b) had a conflict
of interest, c) was of quality or status which violated the principle of
“equality of arms,” or d) failed to follow the Code of Professional Conduct.
Inadequate representation can mean many different things; it could mean: a) the defence
counsel was incompetent, b) there was a conflict of interest between the defendant and the
defence counsel, or c) the quality of the defence counsel was such that there was a violation of
the principle of “equality of arms” between the defence and the prosecution. However, none of
the statutes, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, or Directives on the Assignment of Defence
Counsel for any of the international tribunals or criminal courts provides a clear definition of

*

Under what circumstances can an accused successfully argue inadequate representation by
counsel at trial as a ground of appeal? Please respond to this question in light of the publicly
aired disagreement between the international and the national counsel of the Accused Duch. (See
the Trial Chamber’s Judgment of 26 July 2010.)
8

what “inadequate representation” means. Therefore, any of the above three possibilities could be
a ground for appeal.
Moreover, although the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”)
does not have a Code of Professional Conduct, arguably the requirements for counsel in the
Codes of earlier tribunals are relevant to the ECCC because the ECCC bases its procedures and
rules on the rules of prior tribunals. The Codes of Professional Conduct contain the guidelines
for how the defence counsel should perform, and as a result, failure to comply could be seen as a
form of inadequacy.
2. For an Appeals Chamber to view the defence counsel as “competent,”
counsel must have all the traits that the tribunal requires in its Rules of
Procedure and Evidence. These requirements are repeated and fleshed out
in the Code of Professional Conduct for each tribunal.
The appellate courts of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (“ICTY”) and International Criminal Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and other Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens
responsible for Genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of Neighbouring
States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 (“ICTR”) hold that defence counsel are
considered to be competent provided that they meet all the qualifications required under the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Therefore, in order to understand what adequate counsel is,
one must look to the qualifications of defence counsel in the Rules.
3. ICTY/R Rules provide that defence counsel is presumed to be competent.
To prove inadequate representation due to incompetence, the defendant
must show that there was “gross incompetence” or “gross negligence” such
that “a miscarriage of justice resulted.”

9

International criminal tribunals view the defence counsel as competent and to have shown
due diligence provided there is not a showing of “gross incompetence” or “gross negligence.”
However, the defendant must show more than the fact that gross negligence or gross
incompetence occured; defendant has to show that the negligence was such that a “miscarriage of
justice” resulted. To prove this, the defendant may show prejudice. However, this is not
required.
4. Defence counsel is not required to agree with the defendant on case strategy
and the defendant cannot use a disagreement over strategy as a cause for
replacement of counsel or as a ground for inadequacy of counsel.
Although all the Codes require that defence counsel work in the best interests of the
defendant, tribunal appeals chambers have generally held that provided the defence counsel
believed they were working in the best interest of their clients, a disagreement in strategy cannot
be used by the defendant to claim a conflict of interest between the two parties, that counsel
should be replaced, or that counsel was inadequate.
5. To prove a violation of the principle of “equality of arms” so as to render
the defendant’s representation inadequate, the defendant must prove that
Defence and Prosecution were not equal before the Trial Chamber and/or
that the Trial Chamber failed to act to assist the defendant in making his
case when requested.
Under “equality of arms,” defense and prosecution counsel have to be in equal
positions before the Trial Court when presenting their cases. To prove violation of this
concept, the defendant must show that his defense counsel and the prosecution were not
equal before the Trial Chamber. Additionally, the defendant must prove that they made a
request to the Trial Chamber for assistance to equalize the positions of the counsel, the
defendant’s request was something the Trial Chamber had power to alter or control, and
that the Trial Chamber failed to aid the defendant.
10

6. If the defendant knew of a potential conflict of interest, decided to continue
with counsel despite the conflict, and later appeals because of inadequate
representation due to the conflict of interest, the court will not to grant the
defendant’s request without more information as to why the defendant did
not look for other counsel.
Although conflict of interest is one of the grounds for inadequate counsel, the Codes
control how the tribunals decide regarding this matter. The Codes deal solely with discipline of
the defence counsel and are silent as to how the court will decide regarding the defendant. In
cases about conflict of interest, the international tribunals generally hold that more information is
necessary about the reason behind the defendant’s retention of counsel despite the conflict of
interest in order to rule that there was a recognizable conflict of interest. However, none say
how they would rule if a conflict of interest existed.
7. The courts will not view a defendant’s refusal to work with the counsel as
proof of inadequacy of counsel.
Absent proof that the defence counsel failed in their duties to the defendant, tribunals do
not factor whether the defendant got along with their counsel into their evaluation of the
counsel’s performance. While the defendant is entitled to counsel of their own choice, there are
constraints to this right, and the courts put more weight on whether the defence counsel
performed their duties adequately.

8. The ECCC Appeals Chamber will most likely not hold that the
disagreement between the international and national counsel of Duch
amounts to inadequacy of counsel, based on the standards set forth by the
International Tribunals.
The disagreement in strategy between the international and national counsel that occurred
during the closing arguments of the Duch trial does not satisfy any of the standards that the
tribunals have articulated. Therefore, the ECCC Appeals Chamber will probably find that the

11

disagreement between Duch’s international and national counsel did not amount to inadequacy
of counsel.
C.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS – AMERICAN CONTEXT
1. To prove that counsel was ineffective, the defendant must prove both that
counsel’s performance was inadequate and that counsel’s performance
adversely prejudiced the defendant.

In the United States, to successfully argue inadequate counsel, the defendant must prove
that: a) the defendant’s counsel was ineffective and b) that the performance of the counsel
prejudiced the defendant. Without proving both of these elements, a defendant cannot
successfully argue that his counsel was inadequate and will have no cause for remedy.
2. Proving that defendant’s counsel’s performance was inadequate is difficult
because there is a strong presumption of adequacy by the trial judge, and
because counsel’s actions are evaluated based on a standard of
reasonableness at the time of the case.
In order to prove that a defendant’s trial counsel was inadequate, the defendant must
prove that their counsel’s performance was lacking. In order to do this, the defendant has to
show that the counsel’s actions were below the standard of reasonableness. The standard of
reasonableness is based on prevailing professional norms. Additionally, the defendant must
prove the unreasonableness of defence counsel’s actions with regard to the circumstances of their
case.
Courts are very deferential to the defence counsel and have a presumption that the
actions of the defence counsel were part of trial strategy. Because of the defendant’s high
burden of proof and the highly deferential nature of the trial judges, it is very difficult for a
defendant to prove that his lawyer’s conduct was lacking.
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3.

Duch would not succeed under the second prong of the test because
regardless of who the Trial Chamber weighted the mitigating factors, the
factors only caused the court to steer away from a life sentence

Under the American system, in order to prove inadequate counsel, the defendant must
prove that the inadequacy of the defence counsel prejudiced the defendant’s case. In order to
prove prejudice, the American courts require the defendant prove that absent the error by the
defence lawyer, the result of the case would have been different. However, in Duch’s case, the
trial court never explained how much Duch’s mitigating factors weighed against the crimes he
committed. Rather, the national counsel’s actions undermined the mitigating factor of remorse.
However, this ultimately had little affect on the ruling because the only effect of the mitigating
factors was to cause to court to refuse to consider giving Duch a life sentence. Because the only
effect of the mitigating factors was to close off only one course of action, the court probably
would not have sentenced Duch different if remorse was fully consider. Therefore, Duch fails to
show prejudice and fails the second prong of the test.
4. Duch would not succeed under the American standard because under the
first prong of the test, counsel’s actions were effective, and under the second
prong of the test, the Duch was not adversely prejudiced by the
disagreement between the international and national counsel.
In the United States, proof of violation of the right to effective counsel requires the
defendant prove both that counsel was ineffective and that the ineffectiveness of counsel resulted
in prejudice to the defendant during trial. The American standard is very deferential to the
defendant’s counsel, and the lawyer’s actions are generally viewed as a choice of trial strategy
rather than as failure to be effective. Because of this deferential view, the trial strategy that the
international and national defence counsel used during the closing arguments will not be viewed
as “inadequate.”
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Additionally, if Duch were to argue that the disagreement between his defence lawyers
caused adverse prejudice, he could not prove that the mitigating factors affected by the
disagreement had substantial effect on his trial result. The ECCC charged Duch with very
serious crimes and the effect of mitigating factors, in light of those crimes, was only to close off
life imprisonment as an option. Having remorse fully considered would not have changed this
outcome. Therefore, it is likely that even under the American standard, the tribunal would find
that the disagreement between the international and national defence counsel did not deny Duch
his right to competent counsel.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A.

CLOSING ARGUMENT

In the ECCC, the first case completed was the case of Kaing Guek Eav, a.k.a “Duch”
(“Duch”). Duch was the former Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and later, Chairman of prison S-21,
the largest and worst prison operated by the Khmer Rouge while they were in control of
Cambodia. As the former head of the prison, Duch was indicted as a senior leader who was
“most responsible” for the crimes committed at prison S-21, as required by the Agreement
establishing the ECCC1.
Up until the closing arguments of the case, the defence counsel for Duch, both national
and international, emphasized that while Duch was responsible for crimes committed in the
prison, Duch consistently accepted responsibility for the crimes, showed remorse for the crimes,
1

See Agreement Between The United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia
Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of
Democratic Kampuchea, U.N. - Cambodia, art. 1, June 6, 2003 (“The purpose…[is] bringing to
trial senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the
crimes and serious violations of Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law and
custom, and international conventions recognized by Cambodia, that were committed during the
period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979”) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
1].
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and cooperated with the tribunal. Defence counsel then argued that because of this remorse and
cooperation, the tribunal should mitigate Duch’s sentence.2 However, on the 75th day of the
trial, during his closing argument, the national defence counsel departed from the previous trial
strategy and argued before the court that Duch should be acquitted and released.
The national counsel reasoned that Duch, as chairman of prison S-21, was in the same
official position as other prison chairmen who were not brought before the ECCC. Since the
other former chairmen were not before the ECCC, there was no reason to single out Duch
specifically and punish him when no other similarly situated persons were punished.3
Additionally, the national counsel argued that Duch was only a chairman of S-21, and as such, he
followed the orders of superior officers and never actually gave the orders to torture and kill
people. Duch only carried out the orders.4 For these reasons, the national defence counsel
argued that Duch was not a “…senior [leader] of Democratic Kampuchea and [one of] those who
were most responsible for the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian penal law,
international humanitarian law and custom…”5 and therefore, the ECCC lacked personal
jurisdiction over him.6
When the international defence counsel gave his closing remarks, rather than continuing
the national defence counsel’s argument, international counsel continued to argue that Duch had
shown remorse and his sentencing should be mitigated because of his remorse, acceptance of

2

See Transcript of Trial Proceedings, Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Case No.
001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, 18, ¶ 12-14 (Nov. 26, 2009) [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 28]. See also Id. at 22-23, ¶ 19-9.
3
Transcript of Trial Proceedings, Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Case No. 001/1807-2007/ECCC/TC, 77, ¶ 1-8 (Nov. 25, 2009) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
27].
4
Id. at 102-3, ¶ 20-1.
5
Agreement at 2, art. 1.
6
Transcript (Nov. 25, 2009) at 86, ¶ 12-16.
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responsibility, and cooperation with the ECCC.7 This disagreement between the national and
international defence counsel in Cambodia raises the question of adequacy of representation.8
B.

POSSIBLE GROUNDS FOR APPEAL

The question from the ECCC prosecution does not specify what is it about the
disagreement between the counsel that might raise a claim of inadequate representation.
However, based on the question and the trial transcript, the claim could be phrased in one of
three ways. First, Duch could argue that the entire trial strategy was incorrect from the
beginning. Instead of arguing for mitigation of sentence, the defence counsel should have argued
that the ECCC lacked jurisdiction over Duch and charges against him should be dismissed. One
could infer this argument from the support Duch expressed for the national counsel’s position
following the close of the international defence counsel’s closing statements.9
The second possibility is that Duch will argue that the disagreement between the national
and international defence counsel, which occurred during the closing arguments, prejudiced him
enough to violate his right to adequate counsel.10 Both the disagreement itself and the cause of
the disagreement could be viewed as reasons for the claim of inadequacy of counsel. Duch could
argue that without a united defense, there was no way his defence counsel could argue his case
effectively and in his best interest and thus the disagreement itself denied him the right to
adequate counsel.
Transcript (Nov. 26, 2009) at 75-77, ¶ 24-8. See also Id. at 29-30, ¶ 10 – 13 (30).
See supra note *.
9
Transcript of Trial Proceedings, Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Case No. 001/1807-2007/ECCC/TC, 60, ¶ 14-16 (Nov. 27, 2009) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
29].
10
See Agreement Between The United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia
Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of
Democratic Kampuchea, U.N. - Cambodia, 9, art. 13(1), June 6, 2003, at available at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/agreement/5/Agreement_between_UN_and_RGC.pdf
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].
7
8
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Third, Duch could assert that the national defence counsel’s declaration caused
the trial court to undervalue some of the mitigating factors of his case, as shown by the
judgment, where the court reasons that:
[t]he Accused repeatedly made public apologies and expressed
remorse for his crimes when given the opportunity. The Chamber
finds, however, that the mitigating impact of his remorse is
undermined by his failure to offer a full and unequivocal admission
of his responsibility. In particular, the Accused’s request during the
closing statements for acquittal, despite earlier apparent
admissions of responsibility, diminishes the extent to which his
remorse would otherwise mitigate his sentence.11
This memo will focus on explaining what the standard for proving inadequate counsel,
and proving a violation of the right to adequate counsel, is in the international tribunals and in
the American legal context. This memo will also analyze the application of these established
standards to Duch’s case to determine whether Duch would succeed under either the
international or the American standard, with any of the three possible arguments he might raise
on appeal.
III. INADEQUATE REPRESENTATION
A.
REQUIREMENTS OF INADEQUATE REPRESENTATION CLAIM IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
In the various international criminal tribunals, there is no single established definition of
what inadequate representation means. Rather, when defendants argue for court action because
of inadequate representation, they generally use one of these three reasons:
1) Counsel was incompetent, and thus was ineffective and inadequate;12

11

Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgment, ¶
610 (July 26, 2010) (emphasis added) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 19].
12
See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4, Judgement, (June 1, 2001) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 16]; Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case IT-94-1, Decision on Appellant’s
17

2) Counsel had a conflict of interest which lead to inadequate representation;13 or
3) Circumstances in the case, whether in the defence counsel themselves or in the
surrounding circumstances, led to the defence counsel’s being at a disadvantage
compared to the prosecution. This disadvantage is a violation of the principle of
“equality of arms” and prevents the defence counsel from adequately representing
the defendant.14
This memo will treat these categories as types of inadequate representation.
In addition to the prior categories, the ICTY/R Codes of Professional Conduct may also
illuminate what adequate representation is. The Code of Professional Conduct (“Code”)
“…provide[s] for standards of conduct for counsel in the interests of the fair and proper
administration of justice.”15 Failure to follow these guidelines could result in disciplinary action,

Motion for the Extension of the Time-Limit and Admission of Additional Evidence, (Oct. 15,
1998) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24]; Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT95-16-A, Decision on the Admission of Additional Evidence Following Hearing of 30 March
2001, (April 11, 2001) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 20]; Nikolic v. Prosecutor,
Case No. IT-02-60/1-A, Decision on Motion to Admit Additional Evidence (December 9, 2004)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 13], etc.
13
See Prosector v. Blagojevic & Jokic, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion
for Clarification of Oral Decision regarding Admissibility of Accused’s Statement, (Sept. 18,
2003) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18]; Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT02-54-T, Decision on Assigned Counsel’s Motion For Withdrawal (December 7, 2004)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].
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Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-A, Judgment, (July 12, 1999) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 25]; Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Ojdanic, & Sainovic, Case No. IT-99-37AR73.2, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal on Motion for Additional Funds, (November 13,
2003) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
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Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel Appearing Before the International Tribunal,
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since
1991, IT/125 REV. 3, adopted on May 25, 1993, art. 7, amended on July 22, 2009, available at
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Defence/defence_code_of_conduct_july2009_en.pd
f [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2]. See also Code of Professional Conduct of
Defence Counsel, International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Genocide and other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
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including sanctions. The severe consequences attached to these rules demonstrate how necessary
the tribunals believe these standards are for proper representation of the defendants. This
interpretation is supported by use of the Codes in case law.16
Although the ECCC does not have a Code of Professional Conduct, the ECCC’s structure
is based on a fusion between Cambodia legal structure and international tribunal structure, so the
Internal Rules and the Agreement creating the ECCC have many similarities with the agreements
and procedures in the other international criminal tribunals. Since the ECCC is incorporating
procedures of the other international criminal tribunals into itself17, the Codes of Professional
Conduct used by other tribunals might be relevant to the ECCC as well. Therefore, this memo
will consider what the ICTY and ICTR Codes require of defence counsel as another source to
define adequate representation.

Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for Genocide and other such violations
committed in the territory of Neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December
1994, art.3, adopted on November 8, 1994, available at
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/English%5CLegal%5CDefence%20Counsel%5CEnglish%5C04Code%20of%20Conduct%20for%20Defence%20Counsel.pdf [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 4].
16
See Prosecutor v. Blagojevic & Jokic, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Decision on Independent Counsel
for Vidoje Blagojevic’s Motion to Instruct the Registrar to Appoint New Lead and Co-Counsel,
(July 3, 2003) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17].
17
See Agreement, Between The United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia
Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of
Democratic Kampuchea, U.N. - Cambodia, art. 12(1), June 6, 2003, available at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/agreement/5/Agreement_between_UN_and_RGC.pdf
(“The procedure shall be in accordance with Cambodian law. Where Cambodian law does not
deal with a particular matter, or where there is uncertainty regarding the interpretation or
application of a relevant rule of Cambodian law, or where there is a question regarding the
consistency of such a rule with international standards, guidance may also be sought in
procedural rules established at the international level”) [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 1]; See also Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, with inclusion of
amendments as promulgated on 27 October 2004, U.N. – Cambodia, 13, art. 33, Oct. 27, 2003,
available at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/law/4/KR_Law_as_amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7].
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1. Proving Inadequate Representation Due to Incompetence of Counsel
a. Qualification
The ICTY and ICTR presume that the defence counsel is competent if the counsel met
the requirements listed in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the tribunal.18 The ECCC
does not promulgate Rules of Procedure and Evidence, but rather its requirements of defence
counsel are listed in the Internal Rules. Since the idea of “competence” is attached to the
qualifications the lawyer must have,19 not to where the qualifications are listed, competence in
the ECCC would be based on the conditions in the Internal Rules under Rule 11(4)(b), (c), and
(d).
In the ECCC, in order to be deemed competent:
b) An applicant shall not have been convicted of a serious criminal
or disciplinary offence considered by their professional association
to be incompatible with acting as a defence lawyer;
c) A foreign applicant shall only be required to:
i) be a current member in good standing of a recognised
association of lawyers in a United Nations Member State;
ii) have a degree in law or an equivalent legal or
professional qualification;
iii) have at least 10 (ten) years working experience in
criminal proceedings, as a lawyer, judge or prosecutor, or
See Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-T, Decision on Muvunyi’s Additional
Objections to the Deposition Testimony of Witness QX Pursuant to Article 20 of the Statute and
Rules 44, 44 bis and 73(F) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ¶ 9, (May 31, 2006)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23].
19
See id. at ¶ 9. (Pursuant to these rules, both Duty Counsel and Assigned Counsel are deemed to
be competent. As stipulated in Rule 44(A), subject to verification by the Registrar, “a counsel
shall be considered qualified to represent a suspect or accused, provided that he is admitted to the
practice of law in a State, or is a University professor of law.”)
18
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in some other capacity;
iv) have established competence in criminal law and
procedure at the international or national level; and
v) be fluent in Khmer, French or English.
d) A national applicant shall only be required to:
i) be a member of the BAKC; and:
ii) have established competence in criminal law and
procedure at the national or international level.20
Both the international and national defence counsel had to fulfill the above requirements
to become Duch’s counsel. Thus, Duch’s defence counsel is presumed competent under the
requirements of the Internal Rules.
b. Due Diligence
However, international standards provide another measure of competence beyond the
qualifications of counsel. Defence counsel also is required to show due diligence in handling the
defendant’s case.21 Due diligence requires “…appropriate use of all mechanisms of protection
and compulsion available under the Statute and the Rules of the International Tribunal to bring
evidence on behalf of an accused before the Trial Chamber.”22 Additionally, to act with due
diligence, counsel must “…represent a client “diligently and promptly in order to protect the
client's best interests”23 and “keep a client informed about the status of a matter before the

20

Internal Rules, Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia, rule 11(4)(b)-(d), adopted
on June 12, 2007, amended on September 17, 2010, available at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/fileUpload/121/IRv6-EN.pdf [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
21
See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case IT-94-1, Decision on Appellant’s Motion for the Extension of
the Time-Limit and Admission of Additional Evidence, ¶ 47, (Oct. 15, 1998) (“Due diligence is
a necessary quality of counsel who defend accused persons before the International Tribunal”)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
22

Id.
Prosecutor v. Blagojevic & Jokic, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Decision on Independent Counsel for
Vidoje Blagojevic’s Motion to Instruct the Registrar to Appoint New Lead and Co-Counsel, ¶
82, (July 3, 2003), quoting, Code ICTY, art. 11, available at
23
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Tribunal in which the client is an interested party and … promptly comply with all reasonable
requests for information.”24
In order to prove that defence counsel failed to act with due diligence, the defendant must
prove that defence counsel acted with gross negligence; “…unless gross negligence is shown to
exist in the conduct of either Prosecution or Defence counsel, due diligence will be presumed.”25
The defendant is required not only to show gross negligence, but also to show that “…there was
gross professional negligence leading to a reasonable doubt as to whether a miscarriage of justice
resulted.”26
To prove that a miscarriage of justice occurred, the defendant must prove that “…if [the
evidence or assistance which was absent] had been available at the trial it would have affected
the sentence.”27 A miscarriage of justice must be proven “in fact,” not merely implied based on

http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Defence/defence_code_of_conduct_july2009_en.pd
f [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17].
24
Id. Quoting, Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel Appearing Before the International
Tribunal, International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991, IT/125 REV. 3, art. 12, adopted on May 25, 1993, amended on July 22,
2009, available at
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Defence/defence_code_of_conduct_july2009_en.pd
f (“Although the quoted case is using the Code of the tribunal as support, something the ECCC
does not have, as explained above, the Codes of other tribunals do have some baring on the
ECCC because of the incorporation of international tribunal procedures into the ECCC.”)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
25
Tadic, Decision on Appellant Motion, at ¶ 48[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
24].
26
Id. at ¶ 49.
27
Nikolic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-60/1-A, Decision on Motion to Admit Additional
Evidence, ¶ 24 (December 9, 2004) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 13].
22

the inferences, and it must show prejudice to the interest of justice.28 However, in some cases, it
has been held that failing to show prejudice does not end the inquiry.29
Duch’s situation does not have the elements required to plead inadequate representation
due to incompetence of defence counsel through lack of due diligence. If Duch argued that his
defence counsel acted inadequately in choosing the wrong trial strategy to begin with, Duch
would have to prove that this action caused a miscarriage of justice and thus was gross
negligence. However, there is no way to prove that the court would have been convinced by the
defence counsel arguing, from the beginning, that Duch did not fall under the ECCC’s personal
jurisdiction.30 Duch was charged with crimes against humanity and from the beginning of the
trial, he admitted he was guilty for the crimes that occurred in prison S-21 and accepted
responsibility, suggesting that he was responsible for what occurred there. Additionally, even if
Duch had not accepted responsibility, there is no way to prove that the court would have agreed
with the proposition that Duch was not a senior officer or one of those most responsible. Duch
was before the tribunal because he was believed to fall under the personal jurisdiction of the
28

Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-A, Decision on the Admission of Additional
Evidence Following Hearing of 30 March 2001, ¶ 23 (April 11, 2001) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 20].
29
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4, Judgement, ¶ 78 (June 1, 2001) (“In most cases, the
accused would have to show prejudice as set out in the above-mentioned Tadic Decision and
should such prejudice be proven, the Appeals Chamber would have to acknowledge that the right
of the Accused as guaranteed under the Statute had been violated. However, even if such
prejudice is not proven the question remains, as to whether the proven incompetence constitutes
a violation of the statutory right of the accused to assistance by competent counsel and would
consequently warrant a remedy”) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 16].
30
See Agreement Between The United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia
Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of
Democratic Kampuchea, U.N. - Cambodia, art 2(1), June 6, 2003, available at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/agreement/5/Agreement_between_UN_and_RGC.pdf
(“The present Agreement further recognizes that the Extraordinary Chambers have personal
jurisdiction over senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible
for the crimes referred to in Article 1 of the Agreement”) [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 1].
23

court, irrespective of whether other people who were chairmen had been brought before the
court. Therefore, it is unlikely that the ECCC would hold that they lacked jurisdiction over Duch
because no other chairmen were before them since their initial decision to hold Duch was not
based on the treatment of others in his position.
Additionally, the choice between arguing for mitigation and arguing over personal
jurisdiction was a strategic choice. Duch cannot prove that his defence counsel’s actions violated
his statutory right to adequate counsel because the international criminal tribunals have held in
various cases that a choice of strategy is not punishable under any type of test. In the tribunal’s
eyes, the obligation that the defence counsel owe their client is that “…they act in what they
perceive to be the best interests of the Accused;”31 the defence counsel are not required to agree
with the defendant on what strategy should be used in the trial, nor are they required to use the
most effective strategy possible. This concept has been articulated in case law as a general
prohibition against finding the defence counsel inadequate if the action at issue could be a matter
of strategy. In Prosecution v. Akayesu, the defendant argued that his defence counsel failed to
work with him, bring up detention during trial, and work to rebut the Prosecution’s submissions
and prepare Akayesu’s testimony with him.32 The court failed to find that the defence counsel
had acted without due diligence, noting that
[w]ith respect to the conduct of Counsel during trial, for example,
their alleged failure to prepare adequately for effective
examination and cross-examination, or to object to the admission
of hearsay evidence, the Appeals Chamber finds that there is no

Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Assigned Counsel’s Motion For
Withdrawal, ¶ 19, (December 7, 2004) (emphasis added) [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 21].
32
Akayesu, at ¶ 73, complaints 2,3,4, and 6. (There were more complaints then those listed, but
most of them have little relevance to this memo, so the author excluded them from the summary
of complaints) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 16].
31
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evidence that the possible omissions by the Defence were not part
of a strategy agreed on beforehand with Counsel.33
Because the defendant lacked evidence proving that the actions were something other
than strategy, the ICTR found that “…Counsel's failure to raise any issues or to raise objections
is not proof of incompetence.”34
Similarly, in Barayagwiza, Nahimana, & Ngeze v. Prosecutor, in response to
Barayagwiza’s claim that there were irreconcilable differences between himself and his defence
counsel,35 the ICTR held that “…a divergence of opinion as to the defence strategy cannot in
itself justify that there is a loss of trust in the counsel's abilities or commitment to the case.”36 In
both these cases, defence counsel’s strategic choices were held not to be adequate proof of any
inadequacy or relevant conflict.
Duch has a weaker case than the defendants in Akayesu or Barayagwiza because prior to
the disagreement during the closing statements, everything was part of a clear strategy. In
Duch’s case, there was no ambiguity about whether arguing mitigation was part of defence
strategy, and as such, there is less confusion over whether the actions of his defence counsel
were strategic or something else, unlike in Akayesu or Barayagwiza. Therefore, the court will
most likely find that the actions of the defence counsel were part of a strategy. Because arguing
mitigation of sentence was a strategic choice, the ECCC will not hold that the defence counsel’s
33

Id. at ¶ 83.
Id.
35
Barayagwiza, Nahimana, and Ngeze v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Decision on
Appellant Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza’s Motion Contesting the Decision of the President Refusing
to Review and Reverse the Decision of the Registrar Relating to the Withdrawal of Co-Counsel,
¶ 7 (November 23, 2006), quoting, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza's Motion Contesting the Decision of
the President of 24 th August 2006 Refusing to Review and Reverse the Decision of the Registrar
Dated 27th March 2006 Relating to the Withdrawal of Co-Counsel” filed by Lead Counsel for
Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza on 22 September 2006, ¶ 4, 8, and 17 (September 22, 2006)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 8].
36
Id. at 13.
34
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decision not to argue for dismissal based on personal jurisdiction grounds was proof of
inadequacy. “A lack of trust in counsel based on disagreements in approach to one's defence
strategy is distinguishable from a lack of trust due to a breach by counsel in fulfilling his
professional and ethical responsibilities in the course of representation.”37 Duch would have to
prove something beyond a mere difference in strategic preferences to prove inadequate counsel.
Therefore, under the test for inadequate representation due to incompetence of counsel, Duch
would not succeed in appealing his conviction or getting a new trial.
2. Proving Inadequate Representation Due to Conflict of Interest
Conflict of interest is defined by the Code of the ICTY as follows:
(C) Counsel shall not represent a client in connection with a matter
in which counsel participated personally and substantially as an
official or staff member of the Tribunal or in any other capacity,
unless the Registrar determines, after consultation with the parties
and taking account the views of the Chamber, that there is no real
possibility shown that a conflict between the former and present
assignment exists.
(D) Counsel or his firm shall not represent a client with respect to a
matter if:
(i) such representation will be, or may reasonably be
expected to be, adversely affected by representation of
another client;
(ii) representation of another client will be, or may
reasonably be expected to be, adversely affected by such
representation;
(iii) the matter is the same or substantially related to
another matter in which counsel or his firm had formerly
represented another client (“former client”), and the
interests of the client are materially adverse to the interests
of the former client; or
(iv) counsel’s professional judgement on behalf of the
client will be, or may reasonably be expected to be,
adversely affected by:
(1) counsel’s responsibilities to, or interests in, a
third party; or
37

Id.
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(2) to counsel’s own financial, business, property or
personal interests.38
If there is a conflict of interest, the defence counsel is expected to alert their client of the
conflict and either gain their consent to continue representing them despite the conflict or act in a
way to remove the conflict.39 Conflict of interest is a form of inadequate counsel because the
defence counsel cannot be expected to adequately represent the defendant’s interest when there
are adverse interests she is representing at the same time. However, while conflict of interest is a
clear form of inadequate counsel, the court will not always find inadequate representation where
it takes place. If a defendant agrees to work with the counsel, despite the conflict, the defendant
loses the ability to later complain of a conflict of interest hurting their case, since “ [i]t is
primarily the responsibility of counsel and the person who retains counsel to ensure that chosen
counsel does not ‘labour under a conflict of interest.’”40 Additionally, conflict of interest is not a
valid argument if the defendant purposely acted in a way to cause tension in the relationship.41

38

Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel Appearing Before the International Tribunal,
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since
1991, IT/125 REV. 3, art. 14 (C) and (D), adopted on May 25, 1993, amended on July 22, 2009,
available at
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Defence/defence_code_of_conduct_july2009_en.pd
f (The author is only quoting the ICTY Code on conflict of interest because the Codes of the
ICTR and SCSL closely match the ICTY Code enough to make it not necessary to quote all of
them.) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
39
Id. at art. 14 (E).
40
Prosecutor v. Blagojevic & Jokic, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for
Clarification of Oral Decision regarding Admissibility of Accused’s Statement, ¶ 20 (Sept. 18,
2003) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18].
41
Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Assigned Counsel’s Motion For
Withdrawal, ¶ 18 (December 7, 2004) (“Whether an accused takes action to prevent the creation
of a relationship of trust with assigned counsel or to destroy such a relationship, that does not put
counsel in breach of any provision of the ICTY Code, including Article 14 (A) or (B), which
deal with the question of conflict of interest”) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
21].
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Inadequate representation due to conflict of interest does not apply in Duch’s case
because the conflict was between the views of the two lawyers, not between the defence counsel
and Duch. The case law regarding conflict of interest relates to the defense counsel’s personal
relationships and referred to the attorney’s relationship with the defendant. The facts of Duch’s
situation do not fall into these patterns.
Even if one were to apply the definitions of conflict of interest used in the Code to the
disagreement between the lawyers, Duch’s situation still would not qualify. Neither of the
counsel were representing another client in the case, so the argument does not fall under Rule
14(D)(i) or (ii) type conflict. Neither of the counsel worked on any matter related to this case
previously for another client, and their professional judgment was not affected by personal
concerns or by their responsibilities to a third party; thus the only other types of conflict of
interest mentioned in the Code do not apply to the Duch’s case either. Both lawyers thought they
were doing what was best for the defendant, and whether the disagreement adversely affected
Duch’s case or not, it cannot be claimed that this disagreement, and any adverse effect resulting
from it, were due to a conflict of interest. Therefore, Duch could not appeal successfully on a
claim of inadequate representation due to conflict of interest.
3. Proving Inadequate Representation Due to Violation of “Equality of Arms”
The concept of “equality of arms” is the idea that “… a judicial body [should] ensure that
neither party is put at a disadvantage when presenting its case.”42 This entails that “…the
Prosecution and the Defence must be equal before the Trial Chamber”43 and “…the Chamber
shall provide every practicable facility it is capable of granting under the Rules and Statute when

42

Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 48 (July 12, 1999) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 25].
43
Id. at ¶52.
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faced with a request by a party for assistance in presenting its case.”44 However, the Trial
Chamber is responsible for improving a situation under “equality of arms” only if the defendant
makes a request of the Trial Chamber.45 Additionally, if unequal resources between the defence
and prosecution team cause the disparity, “equality of arms” might not apply because
“…equality of arms between the Defence and the Prosecution does not necessarily amount to the
material equality of possessing the same financial and/or personal resources.”46
One could argue that the disagreement between the international and national defence
counsel put Duch in an unequal position to the prosecution. Instead of presenting one idea to the
judges, the defence presented two contradictory ideas, weakening their case before the Trial
Chamber in comparison to that of the prosecution. However, although Duch is thus at a
disadvantage in presenting his case, this is not something that the Trial Chamber can improve.
Unlike Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Ojdanic, & Sainovic where the defendant was arguing
that a denial of a request of funds led to violation of “equality of arms,” the weakness of Duch’s
position during sentencing cannot be linked to an action by the court. Duch’s case is more
similar to Prosecutor v. Tadic. In this case, “inequality of arms” was caused by the unwillingness
of the Republika Srpska to cooperate with the Defence.47 Duch’s case is more similar to Tadic
because the weakness in his case was caused not by the Tribunal but rather by independent actors
that the tribunal did not control. Although the defence counsel is required to obey the Code and

44

Id.
See id. at ¶. 53. See also id. at ¶ 55 (“The party cannot remain silent on the matter only to
return on appeal to seek a trial de novo, as the Defence seeks to do in this case.”)
46
Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Ojdanic, & Sainovic, Case No. IT-99-37-AR73.2, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal on Motion for Additional Funds, ¶ 23, quoting, Prosecutor v. Kayishema &
Obed, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 69 (June 1, 2001). (The author was unable to find the
actual decision, so she is quoting from a case that cited it) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 22].
47
Tadic Judgment, at ¶ 29 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25].
45
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uphold the name of the tribunal, they must ‘…never be influenced in the matter of his
representation,”48 which includes the influence of the Court itself.
The cause of the disagreement in strategy and the disagreement itself was completely
separate from anything the Trial Chamber controlled or influenced. Moreover, when Duch was
given the chance to complain and ask for aid, he merely agreed with the stance of the national
defence and asked that the national counsel have more time to speak.49

Duch’s problem is not

something that the Trial Chamber could fix because they have no control over the views or
actions of the defence counsel regarding strategy.50 Additionally, Duch failed to ask the Trial
Chamber for aid when given the opportunity and because the Trial Chamber is only required to
use “…every practicable facility it is capable of granting…when faced with a request by a party
for assistance…”51 the Trial Chamber has no remedy for Duch regarding the inequality of arms
that may have resulted from the disagreement between the international and national defence
counsel. Therefore, Duch would not be able to claim inadequate representation through violation
of the principle of “inequality of arms.”
4. Proving Inadequate Representation Through Violation of the Code of
Professional Conduct
As explained earlier, the ICTY and ICTR Codes of Professional Conduct establish the
standard and behaviors defence counsel should observe while defending their client. The ECCC
48

Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel Appearing Before the International Tribunal,
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since
1991, IT/125 REV. 3, art. 10(iii), adopted on May 25, 1993, amended on July 22, 2009,
available at
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Defence/defence_code_of_conduct_july2009_en.pd
f [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
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Transcript of Trial Proceedings, Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Case No. 001/1807-2007/ECCC/TC, ¶14-16 (Nov. 27, 2009) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29].
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See 21-22 of this memo.
51
Id. at ¶ 52.
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does not have a Code of Professional Conduct; however, one could argue that the standards
expressed in the Codes of previous tribunals apply to the ECCC because of its mandate. The
ECCC was created in order to “…to trial senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those
who were most responsible for the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian penal law,
international humanitarian law and custom, and international conventions recognized by
Cambodia….”52 In order to try the defendants before the tribunal under international
humanitarian law and custom, the ECCC must use established international criminal procedures,
which are the procedures of the previous tribunals. Moreover, in cases regarding the other ways
to prove inadequate counsel, the Code of Professional Conduct for the tribunal is looked to as a
guide.53 As such, the procedures and standards used by previous tribunals are relevant to the
ECCC.
One continuing thread in all the Codes is the idea that counsel is required to “…consult
with the client about the means by which those objectives are to be pursued, but is not bound by
the client’s decision.” 54 Since this standard is consistent among all the Codes, one can assume

52

Agreement Between The United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning
the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea, U.N. - Cambodia, art. 1, June 6, 2003, available at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/agreement/5/Agreement_between_UN_and_RGC.pdf
(emphasis added) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].
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See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Assigned Counsel’s Motion
For Withdrawal, ¶ 4 (December 7, 2004)[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21] ; See
also Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Ojdanic, & Sainovic, Case No. IT-99-37-AR73.2, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal on Motion for Additional Funds, 9, n.29 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 22].
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Code Professional Conduct for Counsel Appearing Before the International Tribunal,
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since
1991, IT/125 REV. 3, art. 8(B)(ii), adopted on May 25, 1993, amended on July 22, 2009,
available at
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Defence/defence_code_of_conduct_july2009_en.pd
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that this is a generally accepted standard of defence counsel. The ICTY has held that although
“[c]ounsel has an obligation to consult with the Appellant… he is not bound by the Appellant's
views as to what are the best means to achieve the objects of the Appellant's defence.”55 Under
this concept, defence counsel is allowed to make defense decisions that the defendant does not
agree with provided that they consulted with the defendant before, and they executed the action
because they felt it was the best way to benefit the defendant.
A perfect example of this concept is Blagojevic. In this decision, the Trial Chamber had
to decide whether to appoint new lead counsel and co-counsel for Blagojevic. Blagojevic refused
to work with his defence counsel, claiming that there was an atmosphere of distrust between the
two of them, due to the defence counsel ignoring Blagojevic’s request that Suzana Tomanovic
not be appointed as co-counsel and lead counsel’s refusal to appoint co-counsel that Blagojevic
requested.56 The Trial Chamber ruled against Blagojevic, because the counsel consulted with
Blagojevic and explained that he would be appointing Ms. Tomanovic as co-counsel57 and the
lead counsel had good cause to ignore Blagojevi’s instructions and appoint Ms. Tomanovic

Defence Counsel, International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Genocide and other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for Genocide and other such violations
committed in the territory of Neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December
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because she was a good candidate for the position and a better candidate then the person who
Blagojevic had suggested.58
Duch’s case is similar enough to Blagojevic to raise the question of whether the defence
counsel acted as they should have under the Code of Conduct, and the differences between the
cases are not enough to make the likely result for Duch different from what occurred in
Blagojevic. In Duch’s case, if the first possibility for appeal is assumed, that defence counsel
failed to make the right argument from the beginning, then as in Blagojevic, the defence counsel
acted in opposition to what the defendant wanted. However, what makes Duch different is it is
unclear whether Duch expressed to his defence counsel from the start of the case that he wanted
to argue for lack of personal jurisdiction (arguing that because of his position as chairman, he
was neither a senior leader, nor one of those most responsible). It is doubtful that Duch did so
since he pled guilty to the crimes he was charged with and spent much of the trial expressing his
remorse for the actions he committed. While this could have been part of a strategy to soften the
judges to make the later request for acquittal more palatable, it is unlikely that is the case since
Duch did not express his desire to be acquitted until after the national defence counsel brought
up the possibility.
Duch’s case is also similar to Blagojevic in that his lawyers, like the lead counsel for
Blagojevic, acted as they thought was best for the defendant. It has not been established why the
national defence counsel suddenly changed his defence strategy during the closing phase of the
trial; however, there is a presumption that he did what he thought was the best strategy for Duch.
The international defence counsel can be presumed to have done the same. Since both lawyers
are making a good faith decision that their strategy is what is best for Duch, even though they
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disagree, neither of them is acting purposely against Duch’s interest. Since there is not clear
evidence that Duch failed to consult with his defence counsel about their trial strategy and
because there is a presumption, which has not been rebutted, that each lawyer acted in the what
they thought was the best interest of the defendant, as in Blagojevic, the ECCC will not find for
Duch if he appeals based on inadequate representation by violation of the Code of Professional
Conduct.

B.
REQUIREMENTS OF INADEQUATE REPRESENTATION CLAIM IN
THE AMERICAN CONTEXT
1. Reasons for Looking at American Standard
United States jurisprudence is well respected internationally in regards to procedural
rights during trial because procedural rights are enshrined in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution and American legal precedent on the subject has developed since the 1700s. As
such, international tribunals occasionally cite American law in their opinions.59 Because of this
respect for American law, it is possible that the ECCC, in addition to international tribunal
precedent, may look to American precedent to determine the answer to Duch’s appeal, especially
because the United States has a clear, defined rule on what is necessary to prove inadequate
counsel. Therefore, this memo will consider the American standard of law regarding adequate
representation.
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2. Defining American Standard
In America, to prove that defence counsel was inadequate, the defendant must prove that
“…counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the
trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”60 To do so, the defendant must prove
that:
…counsel's performance was deficient. This requires
showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defence. This requires showing that
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a
fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes
both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death
sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that
renders the result unreliable.61
The defendant does not always need to show that the counsel’s conduct was particularly
egregious; rather, if the defendant can prove that “…counsel entirely fails to subject the
prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth
Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable.”62
To prove that the defence counsel was deficient, the defendant has to prove “…counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”63 Part of the standard of
reasonableness expected of defence counsel in their position is;
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…assist[ing] the defendant, … a duty of loyalty, a duty to
avoid conflicts of interest, …duty to advocate the defendant’s
cause, …[duty] to consult with the defendant on important
decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important
developments in the course of the prosecution, …[and] a duty to
bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a
reliable adversarial testing process.64
In addition to these general things, American courts also consider whether the defence
counsel’s actions were reasonable in regard to all the circumstances of the case.65 Courts
“…indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance; … the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’”66 To determine
whether the action was sound trial strategy, the court looks at not just the strategy, but also the
process that led to the choice of strategy.67 Additionally, the defendant has to provide specific
instances where the defence counsel failed to act reasonably.68
In order to prove that the defence counsel’s errors were enough to “deprive the defendant
of a fair trial,”69 the defendant must affirmatively prove prejudice.70 To prove prejudice, the
defendant must prove that “…there is a reasonable probability [‘…a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome’]71 that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
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of the proceeding would have been different.”72 Not only does the result have to be different, but
defendant must prove that their lawyer’s errors “…were so serious as to deprive the defendant of
a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”73 This is a high standard to overcome because
“[u]nreliability or unfairness does not result if the ineffectiveness of counsel does not deprive the
defendant of any substantive or procedural right to which the law entitles him.”74
In deciding whether the defence counsel’s actions prejudiced the defendant, the court
considers all facts of the case, those affected by the error and unaffected, and determines whether
the defendant proved that but for the defence counsel’s actions, the result of the trial would have
been different. There are cases where the court will find that actions by the defence counsel are
presumptively prejudicial to the defendant and the defendant need not prove prejudice; these are
when defence counsel actively represents conflicting interests,75 when defendant is in an hostile
environment, where they know no one, have not been assigned counsel by the court, and the
counsel they have are not committed to the case and have not had a chance to adequately prepare
their case,76 and when defence counsel represents multiple defendants.77 However, as the
examples show, they are very limited in number; “…only when surrounding circumstances
justify a presumption of ineffectiveness can a Sixth Amendment claim be sufficient without
72
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inquiry into counsel's actual performance at trial.”78 Courts will decide whether the
circumstances justify a presumption of ineffectiveness by looking at “…the time afforded for
investigation and preparation; (2) the experience of counsel; (3) the gravity of the charge; (4) the
complexity of possible defenses; and (5) the accessibility of witnesses to counsel.”79
Although Strickland is the recognized test used in the United States, keep in mind that
“…there are situations in which the overriding focus on fundamental fairness may affect the
analysis.”80
3. Application of American Standard to Duch’s Case
a. Failure to Act As Their Station Demands
The American standard for proving inadequate representation requires Duch to prove not
only that his defence counsel was deficient, but that the deficiency was enough to deprive him of
a fair trial. The disagreement between the Duch’s defence lawyers does not pass the first part of
the test, whether the defence counsel failed to act as their station requires them to. Neither
defence lawyer had a conflict of interest and both (as far as we know), by advocating their
individual positions, thought they were advocating for the defendant’s cause. It is unclear
whether each defence lawyer consulted with the defendant on trial strategy, but based on his
comments, Duch appeared to agree with the stance of the national defence counsel during the
closing arguments, but failed to complain about the strategy the international counsel.
Based on this lack evidence of what Duch’s opinion towards the strategic theories was,
one could assume that the defendant found both of them acceptable but wanted dismissal rather
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than imprisonment. Based on the trial transcripts, when the national defence presented their
theory, there was no sign that either counsel was disloyal to Duch. Both were assisting the
defendant in making his case, and both were using their knowledge and skills to argue for the
defendant. Nothing in their actions show that either defence counsel failed to act as their
position requires.
b. Reasonableness of Each Attorney’s Actions
Regarding the second prong of the test, both the theories of the defence counsel could be
viewed as reasonable. If Duch is not a senior leader or one of those most responsible for the
crimes, then the ECCC has no personal jurisdiction over him and must dismiss all charges and
release him. Arguing that the Duch was not a senior leader nor one of those most responsible
was not an unreasonable claim. And arguing for mitigation based on Duch’s actions was also a
reasonable strategy. Throughout the trial, Duch cooperated with the tribunal and showed
remorse, both of which show that a defendant is sorry for their actions. Remorse and assistance
to the tribunal are both mitigating factors,81 and emphasizing them is a rational defense
considering the magnitude of the crimes Duch is charged with. By themselves, both the trial
arguments of the international and national defence counsel were reasonable and the analysis that
leads to both conclusions is reasonable as well.
However, considering all the possibilities of appeal, the only unreasonable factor was the
time the national defence counsel decided to present the alternative theory. Under Wiggins, the
reason or process that led to the decision to act a certain way has to be reasonable as well.82
Presenting a new defence argument during the closing arguments can be unreasonable. At this
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point, the judges have heard all the evidence and probably have a clear idea of how they will rule
on the defendant’s guilt. Introducing an argument for absolute dismissal has no effect at this
stage on whether they will convict the defendant or not, since the arguments do not affect the
validity of the evidence already presented, and it has come too late in the proceedings to have
much of an impact. Given the circumstances, it was reasonable to avoid bringing this up at
closing arguments because it undermines one of the defendant’s mitigating factors, his remorse.
However, one could argue that the national defence counsel’s argument and timing were
reasonable. Closing arguments can be the last chance a lawyer has to convince the court of their
view before they make their decision. One could argue that what the national defence counsel
did was an attempt to use that chance. He could have presented his new theory to make the
judges question their views on whether to convict or not, saving his client at the last minute.
And while this possibility seems unlikely, provided that there are reasonable explanations for the
action, American courts consider possibilities that make the lawyer’s actions reasonable.
Bell v. Cone is an example of this. In this case, the defendant’s counsel failed to present
mitigating evidence during the sentencing stage, outside of discussing it in their opening
statement, and waived his final argument. In response to the defendant’s appeal, the court held
that the defendant’s counsel could have been acting reasonably because there were possible
reasonable explanations behind all the lawyer’s actions. The Court reasoned that counsel failed
to bring medical experts for testimony because “…counsel reasonably could have concluded that
the substance of their testimony was still fresh to the jury.”83 In response to the claim that
waiving the final statement was unreasonable, the Court noted that because counsel had a choice
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between two possibly damaging results for the defendant84, “[n]either option, it seems to us, so
clearly outweighs the other that it was objectively unreasonable for the Tennessee Court of
Appeals to deem counsel's choice to waive argument a tactical decision about which competent
lawyers might disagree.”85 In this case, as long as there was a possibility of a reasonable motive
for behind the lawyer’s actions, the court held that these possible motives had to be considered in
determining the reasonableness of the lawyer’s actions.
The Court ultimately remanded this case because “[g]iven the choices available to
respondent's counsel and the reasons we have identified, we cannot say that the state court's
application of Strickland's attorney-performance standard was objectively unreasonable.”86
However, despite the remand, Bell is a great example of the amount of deference American
courts afford to counsel’s actions. If there could be a reasonable motive behind the counsel’s
actions, given the circumstances, then it has to be considered.
In Duch’s case, national counsel’s actions could be reasonable given slim chance of Duch
receiving a low sentence. Duch was accused of being one of those most responsible for crimes
against humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. Although he had accepted
responsibility from the beginning of trial, there was a strong chance that he would be sentenced
to many years in prison because of the magnitude of the crimes. And he was being tried in a
court, located in a country, where the majority of the population wanted him to go to jail for the
crimes committed at prison S-21. Given the direness of the situation, trying a “last-ditch” effort
to save your client could be a reasonable thing to do. If the ECCC holds that the national defence
counsel’s actions were reasonable in acting at that point in time and in their strategy, then Duch
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could succeed on the first prong of the test. However, it is unclear whether all components of the
action, both the timing and the strategy itself, have to be reasonable to fit the reasonableness
prong of the American standard.
c.Did the Actions of the Defence Counsel Prejudice the Defendant
Even if the timing of the national defence counsel’s new theory was unreasonable, Duch
would not succeed on appeal under American law because he would be unable to prove that this
action deprived him of a fair trial. In order to prove that he was denied a fair trial, Duch has to
prove that but for the national defence counsel’s action, the trial result would have been
different. This does not have to be a large difference; a small difference in the outcome may be
enough.87 However, as stated earlier, this difference must affect a substantive or procedural
right.88 According to the Agreement between the UN and the Kingdom of Cambodia, the rights
of the defendant are those listed in Article 14 and Article 15 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.89 None of those rights were affected by the actions of the international
or national defence counsel. Duch’s problem is that the national defence counsel’s actions
weakened the defence position in front of the judges and weakened his argument for mitigation;
however, having an airtight defence is not one of the rights protected by Article 14 and 15 of the
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ICCPR. 90 Therefore, under the American analysis, because there is no procedural or substantive
right that was affected, Duch was not prejudiced by the defence counsel’s actions and therefore
would not succeed on appeal.
If the ECCC were to ignore the procedural or substantive requirement of the American
standard, Duch’s appeal still would not succeed. The only mitigating factor national counsel
affected was mitigation based on remorse. Including remorse, the Trial Chamber considered five
mitigating factors in total. Of the five, only four were used by the judges; this included
remorse.91 Of the four, three were given limited effect or undermined for various reasons.92 The
ECCC ultimately sentenced him to 35 years and deducted time from the sentence for violations
of his rights93 and the time he spent in jail.94 Considering the weakness of the mitigating factors
as a whole, it is doubtful that remorse being fully consider would have had that much of an effect
on the ruling.
Moreover, the only thing the court says about how the mitigating factors affected the
sentencing is that “…there are significant mitigating factors which mandate the imposition of a
finite term of imprisonment rather than a life sentence.”95 Without more, one can assume that the
only affect the mitigating factors had on the sentencing was to prevent a life sentence, and as
such, whether the court fully valued his remorse or not would not make a difference in the
outcome of the sentencing. Difference in outcome absent the actions of the lawyer is necessary
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to prove prejudice under the American standard, and because there would be no difference in
outcome, Duch could not argue that the national defense counsel’s actions “prejudiced his
interests.”
As discussed earlier, there are certain cases where there is a presumption of prejudice.96
Duch’s case does not fall under any of these case specific exceptions; 1) the defence counsel did
not represent conflicting interests, 2) although Duch is in a hostile environment, he knows
people, has been assigned competent counsel, and without more information, there is no clear
sign that the defence counsel lacked adequate time to prepare, and 3) the defence counsel only
represented him at the trial.
In addition to those specific instances, the American standard also looks at certain aspects
of a case to determine whether the circumstances deserve a presumption of prejudice.97 Under
this test, a presumption of prejudice would not apply in Duch’s case because none of the factors
show that the circumstances were such that counsel would be ineffective regardless of their
actions: 1) Without more information, one has to assume that both the international and the
national counsel had ample time to prepare their defence during the trial, and while the
international counsel had to rework his closing argument because the national defence attorney’s
position, in the larger context of the entire trial, this did not harm the international counsel’s
ability except in the closing arguments; 2) The fact that both counsel were representing the
defendant shows that they are experienced, because they had to meet the qualifications of the
Internal Rules to be in their positions; 3) Duch was charged with crimes against humanity and
violations of the Geneva conventions, both very serious crimes; however, the seriousness of the
crime does not reveal anything about the defence counsel’s ability to prepare for the case; 4)
96
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Both defenses argued could be complex, but it was not the complexity of the defenses that
caused the problem; rather, it was the timing of the national counsel’s defence; and 5) Lastly,
Duch had a right to examine witnesses98, and nothing shows that his counsel was prevented from
doing so. Moreover, accessibility to witnesses was not the problem; the problem was the two
divergent strategies of defence appearing during sentencing. Presumption of prejudice does not
apply in Duch’s case because neither the disagreement between defence counsel, nor the trial,
created circumstances where the defendant’s counsel would have been ineffective regardless of
their performance. As such, Duch would not be able to prove that but-for the national counsel’s
action, the trial would have ended differently, leaving him unable to prove inadequate
representation under the American legal system.

IV. CONCLUSION
Duch would not succeed in appealing for either dismissal or a new trial due to inadequate
representation under either the international criminal tribunal legal standard or the American
legal standard. If Duch argues that his defence counsel was inadequate because they failed to
argue for acquittal from the very beginning of the trial, both systems would find that the actions
of defence counsel were valid and reasonable. In both systems, counsel can exercise a different
trial strategy than that preferred by the defendant provided that this strategy was viewed by the
lawyers as the best move for the defendant, which it reasonably could be.
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Were Duch to argue that the lack of unity between the defence lawyers caused inadequate
representation, he would fail under international criminal tribunal precedent because not only
was this issue not something the Trial Chamber could control for, but the defendant acquiesced
to the disunity by agreeing with the national lawyer’s new position. The fact that Duch agreed
with the national defence while neither rejecting the international defence counsel’s posture, nor
showing any dislike of the posture up until the national counsel presented his new legal position
suggests that the disunity between the counsel did not bother Duch. Additionally, because he
failed to ask for Trial Chamber assistance, the Chamber will view his actions as showing
agreement with the state of disunity between the counsel.
Under American standards, even though the disunity could impair his defence, the gravity
of the crimes the ECCC charged Duch with were such that even with unity, the result of the trial
would not have changed much. So Duch would fail to succeed in either system under that
argument.
Lastly, if Duch argues that his defence was inadequate because the argument caused the
Trial Chamber to discard one of his mitigating factors, Duch still would not succeed because the
effect of the loss was not substantial. Under international criminal tribunal precedent, the only
way Duch’s claim would be evaluated is under the idea that he had inadequate representation
because his lawyers failed to act with due diligence. However, Duch would not succeed on that
ground because he could not argue that the disagreement was an act of gross negligence.
Considering the small weight of the mitigating force of remorse relative the other mitigating
factors99 approved and the gravity of the crimes Duch was charged with, the full mitigating force
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of remorse was not enough to greatly affect the result of the trial. Additionally, since the only
thing the mitigating factors did as prevent a life sentence, had the court fully considered remorse
in their deliberations, the sentence would not be different. So the disagreement was not enough
to prejudice Duch and result in the miscarriage of justice required to prove that gross negligence
occurred. Thus, the Court would hold against Duch.
In the American system, because the disagreement occurred during the closing arguments
of the trial, and remorse would not have lowered the sentence enough to substantially change it,
Duch cannot argue that but-for the actions of the national defence, the trial outcome would have
been substantially different. Therefore, Duch would not succeed in his appeal under this standard
either. Duch would not succeed in appealing his conviction or sentence if the Appeals Chamber
uses international criminal tribunal or American precedent.

V. CONTINUING RESEARCH
French and Cambodian legal precedents were considered as other avenues to examine for
this memo because the ECCC has some civil law aspects (e.g., the use of investigating judges,)
Cambodia is where the tribunal is held, Cambodia uses the civil law system, and Cambodia was
a former French colony and France uses the civil law system. However, the memo’s author does
not understand French or Khmer, limiting the amount of material available for examination.
Additionally, of the French law translations available, none were found that mentioned the right
to “adequate counsel”. Therefore, French and Cambodian laws or case precedent are not
considered in this memo. However, if further research on the topic is desired, French and
Cambodia law may be a good avenue to pursue.
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